It is hardly news that US relations with the rest of NATO (“rNATO” hereafter) are at an unprecedentedly low ebb. But they took a new and interesting twist last week when the US Under Secretary of War for Policy, Elbridge Colby, issued a curious statement via social media, opining that “middle powers” have no coherent basis for alignment independent of the United States, and that they would therefore be foolish to try.
The “middle powers” in question here are erstwhile US allies with enough of their own wealth and technological capacity to pursue meaningful sovereign capabilities, but not enough to independently rival systemic great powers such as the United States (the likes of Germany, Japan, Britain, Canada, Australia and so forth).
Colby is a serious strategic mind. His earlier work on strategic stability and the perils of nuclear abolition is excellent, for example. He also has a coherent strategic vision for the United States (pivoting US power to deny any Chinese bid for hegemony in the Indo-Pacific by deprioritizing other theaters). His superiors appreciate neither – but that’s hardly his fault. Such recognition notwithstanding, however, his statement still contained at least five key tensions.
First, retrenching total US support to rNATO – and “playing harder to get” generally – would have been one thing. It would indeed have incentivized rNATO states that have long underspent on defense to do more to support the US position. But that isn’t what the United States has done.
Instead, the US turned actively predatory. Trying to coerce Denmark out of its territory in Greenland. Quips about annexing Canada. Hammering allies with tariffs, even while demanding they spend big to support US statecraft. Toying with backing Argentine designs on Britain’s Falkland Islands. Insulting rNATO veterans who fought in the US-instigated “War on Terror” and more besides.
As a student of realism, Colby will know that attempting to bandwagon with a “greedy” predator – especially a powerful one – is very dangerous. Since it gets relatively stronger through each concession, it becomes even better placed to devour you next time. That’s why realists obsess over trying to discern signals of hostile intent. And by “overcooking” its coercion of rNATO states – by shifting from merely doing less for such countries to actively menacing them – Washington has been throwing out such signals.
The prudent response to a greedy predator is “balancing,” of both external and internal priorities (i.e. alliances and rearmament). Such balancing incentives thus provide the “coherent basis for alignment” that Colby suggests the countries in question lack. In fact, his statement implicitly recognizes – and attempts to head off – such incentives, arguing (to paraphrase) that “you can’t do without us, also you shouldn’t do without us”.
It’s true, of course, that the “middle powers” in question are a disparate bunch – in size, location and priorities – which limits their prospects for genuine unity of effort. But the more coercive the United States becomes in its dealings with current/erstwhile allies, the more it incentivizes them to coalesce
Recipients of US officials’ messages have their own nationalisms too, however
“Soft” balancing that imposes extra costs on revisionist behavior is already taking place. Industrial build-ups that create capacity for future strategic autonomy. Hedged positioning vis-à-vis other great powers. The rNATO states have recently been doing all of these, from (respectively) their denial of basing/intelligence support for certain types of especially system-destabilizing US behavior, to their massive domestic defense-industrial push, to their economic overtures to China.
Second, Colby’s thread implies certain flawed assumptions. Notably, international politics is no longer unipolar, where the US holds the majority of economic, military and cultural influence. There’s now another great power in the international system – the very one that Colby wants a US “pivot” away from – with a larger economy (on a purchasing-power basis) than the United States. To be sure, China is hardly innocent of its own hostile behaviors towards rNATO states. But if Washington turns too coercive, the Europeans (in particular) do have alternative options for economic and diplomatic cooperation. US officials are free to assert, as Colby does, that America is the only “free world” superpower… but if you’re Danish or Canadian, it’s not China that’s pushing to annex your territory.
Beyond a risen China, the combined economic output of rNATO also remains bigger (in purchasing-power terms) than the United States. That sits atop some serious manufacturing heft (Germany), exquisite nuclear technology (France), and more. Yes, European economies are sclerotic, atomized and, per-capita, poorer. But the suggestion that Europe couldn’t possibly achieve any meaningful level of strategic autonomy is dubious. To be sure, rNATO states never previously achieved substantial strategic autonomy (and coordination remains hard)… but they never previously tried, either – at least not in earnest – because US power looked more like an advantage than a danger. Change that latter calculation and other things may start to shift, too.
A related problem with too narrow a balance-of-power realism – “rNATO is weak so it offers nothing and also has nothing to withhold” – is that it misses crucial alliance inputs to national security… even to a superpower’s national security. For example, which actually does more for US citizens’ safety: a few more Canadian frigates augmenting the already-massive US Navy? Or Canadian intelligence colleagues rushing to call their American counterparts if they detect an Islamist cell in Vancouver? And which would harm US security more if Ottawa wasn’t minded to help, because of another annexation threat?
Third, another of Colby’s assumptions – that of US indispensability – isn’t wholly wrong, but now carries steep caveats. Of course, if you’re Taiwan or Latvia, with hostile and much stronger powers breathing down your necks, then you’re desperate for any outside great-power help you can get. And even if you’re bigger and less geographically exposed – the Japans, Germanys, Britains, Australias and so forth – you’d still much rather have US backing in a darkening world, and will bear non-trivial costs to try to shore it up… hence the enduring clamor for US support.
Equally, however, the United States doesn’t currently look like a system-stabilizer from any of those countries. It’s wrecked their energy security and given them another spike of inflation with more failed Middle Eastern wars. Its imperial vassalization of Venezuela – and the emboldenment that apparently followed – sent more predatory signals. Crucially, it also depleted its arsenals, exposed its operational concepts’ limits, and proved unable to shield its allies and bases in those same unsuccessful Middle Eastern wars. So, if you’re Taiwanese or Latvian, you’re now even more alarmed. Ditto if you’re a customer of US weapons waiting on backlogged resupply of (for example) surface-to-air missiles.
Fourth, Colby’s arguments about the US defense-industrial base (DIB) contain a stark contradiction. Specifically, he argues that such allies shouldn’t bother “trying in vain” to replicate US arms production, because it makes the “best” weapons on an assured scale. Yet he also notes explicitly that allied access “is a privilege, not a right,” thereby emphasizing that US arms supply is something Washington can deny to allies for coercive purposes. This neatly encapsulates one of the long-standing tensions in US hegemony: the preference for allies to relieve US burdens (which necessitates building more power of their own) while remaining wholly subordinate to US strategy (which implies total dependence on US power).
Then there’s the contestable claim that US weaponry is always the best for the money. In fact, it sometimes is, but sometimes isn’t – especially when “best” is taken in local context. That context includes geopolitical circumstances, customers’ place in the production queue, whether through-life support costs are debilitating, whether there’s a political “kill switch” attached, and whether US suppliers promptly integrate customers’ own systems. Furthermore, the great advantage of buying domestically – as pork-hungry US legislators well know – is that the euros, pounds and krone spent recirculate through the domestic economy.
Fifth, there is a broader political point here. “Colby Realism” has a logic, as noted at the outset. But it’s been derailed in Colby’s own country by the bitter-yet-hubristic nationalism of his bosses and their political base… hence why a “Pivot to Asia” advocate has found himself rationalizing annexation efforts in Europe and yet more war in the Gulf.
Recipients of US officials’ messages have their own nationalisms too, however. So, a US Under Secretary of Defense can declare “Look, ‘middle powers’, you’re too weak for independent strategy, so don’t bother trying… just obey us like you did before.” It could even be true (although it probably isn’t). Yet given how nationalism works – and especially given certain recent US behavior – the reaction to such belittlement is likely to simply be more defiance.
As a seasoned scholar of politics, Colby presumably knows this – so it’s unfortunate that his current government role has required issuing such a message nonetheless.
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