Iran

I was playing cricket* yesterday, so wasn’t able to follow events in Iran too closely. Happily, Andrew Sullivan’s blog means that it’s easy to catch-up. Andrew, of course, has been at his considerable best these past few days, but yesterday’s marathon live-blog was something else. Newspapers, at least in this instance, are now the second draft of history; blogs, Youtube, camera phones and Twitter are the first. Reading Andrew’s live-blog – a compendium of tweets from Iran, video footage, stills photography, commentary and links to other sources of information around the web – is a pretty draining experience; producing it must have exhausted Andrew and his brace of helpers, Chris

In his cover story for this week’s edition of the magazine James is, quite characteristically, honest enough to acknowledge that the consequences of attacking Iran would be “horrendous” and, of course, he is also right to argue that there are any number of terrible possibilities if Iran does acquire nuclear weapons. He sums them up: It would spark an arms race across the Middle East. Many in the intelligence community are convinced that Saudi Arabia has a deal with Pakistan to buy a bomb off the shelf if Iran goes nuclear: a Shiite bomb must be countered with a Sunni one. Iran would also step up its support for disruptive,

Democracy in America goes back to pre-election profiles of Mir Hossein Mousavi and finds a “cautious, pragmatic, vague and increasingly shrewd politician.” This seems a fair verdict and, as we know, Mousavi can hardly be the perfect poster-boy for liberals since, if he were, he wouldn’t have been permitted to stand in the first place. But that was then and this is now. The movement is bigger than Mousavi now and it’s hard to see how much of it he and his advisers really control anyway. What can be said is that reform is a process, not an event. Furthermore, I would hazard that the regime faces a pretty bleak

Ezra Klein has copped some stick for his observation that: There are a couple things to say about this, all of them depressing. First, those of us who have long argued for the fundamental rationality of the Iranian regime have seen our case fundamentally weakened. A rational regime might have stolen the election. But they would not have stolen it like this, where there is no doubt of the theft. I a) disagree with Ezra and b) think he’s being too hard on himself. That is, there is a difference between the rationality of the Iranian regime’s foreign policy and its attitude towards domestic dissent. One can believe that Iran

For real: Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on Wednesday accused his election rivals of adopting smear tactics used by Germany’s dictator Adolf Hitler and said they could face jail for insulting him. Ahmadinejad was speaking at a rally in Tehran on the final day of an increasingly bitter and hard-fought election campaign, in which he faces a growing challenge from moderate former prime minister Mirhossein Mousavi. Mousavi and the two other candidates say Ahmadinejad has lied about the state of the economy which is suffering from high inflation and a fall in oil revenues from last year’s record levels. Ahmadinejad said his rivals had broken laws against insulting the president. “No

Marty Peretz makes a sensible point: A story by Parisa Hafezi at Reuters knocks the wind out of the expectation that, if Dr. A’jad loses his re-election campaign, Iran’s nuclear policy will be changed. These matters rest in the head and hands of the Ayatollah Al Khamenei, the Supreme Leader, successor to the revolutionary founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Ayatollah Khomeini. Well, it’s a sort-of-sensible point. I’m not sure how many people really think that Iran’s nuclear policy might change, regardless of the result of the elections. However, it is important that more people understand that Ahmadinejad is not the man in charge when it comes to

Of all the many reasons to be wary of bombing Iran, one of the best is also one of the simplest: it won’t work. Or, rather, whatever advantage there may be in delaying Iran’s nuclear ambitions by a year or two is unlikely to be worth the unfortunate consequences involved, merely increasing the risks of a nuclear Iran further down the line. As Deence Secretary Robert Gates says: Using his strongest language on the subject to date, Gates told a group of Marine Corps students that a strike would probably delay Tehran’s nuclear program from one to three years. A strike, however, would unify Iran, “cement their determination to have