France

Britain and isolation

The word ‘isolation’ is used a lot in today's newspapers, as if Cameron walking away from the ongoing EU implosion were a self-evident disaster. Pick up the Guardian and you see Britain cast as a leper, a status conferred on her thanks to a tragic miscalculation by a Prime Minister whose sole aim was to assuage his swivel-eyed Tory MPs and get back on Bill Cash's Christmas card list. Orwell would have great fun with the language that accompanies the Euro project: trying to suck up to its tiny elite is seen as a country being outward looking. A PM more focused on the people who sent him to office is seen as a parochialist. Spend too much time in SW1 and you may come to believe this yourself.

What Cameron can do next

What now? That’s the question. This morning it looks not like 17 versus 10, but like 1 versus 26, which is a cold and lonely place for Britain to be. But it is also the right place to be. David Cameron asked for a little and got less. He had to act as he did and will reap the benefit electorally and among his MPs. Labour’s position is not just politically weak, but also unrealistic: it has been clear for weeks it was not possible to run a ‘periphery strategy’ as the 10 states outside the Euro have different incentives to Britain and different long-term aims. And the idea that the last Labour government had better links to the continent is laughable.

A dozen questions for after the Brussels summit

Cameron will be depicted in tomorrow's press as either a Tory Boudicca or an Essex Bulldog (© Tristram Hunt), depending on your point of view. I suspect the truth is somewhere in between. Cameron did not go in swinging a handbag, although it will suit No10 to make out that he did. But Labour's caricature of him storming off and wasting the veto certainly doesn't ring true to me. An EU27 deal was never likely, and EU17 deal always was. Cameron, on their account, just seems to be being blamed for what was going to happen all along. In any case, we are still trying to assemble the pieces of last night's drama, work out the demands and counter-demands, and see what sort of picture they produce. I'm still not sure.

What could Cameron have done differently?

It is hard not to see the results of last night’s European meeting as the first step towards a fundamentally different — and much looser — relationship between Britain and the EU. The UK, which for centuries has fought to keep any one power from dominating the continent, and for decades has sought to prevent a two-speed Europe from emerging, is now going to have to accept both. It also seems that it will have to protect itself from some form of fiscally-shaped missile against the City.   The irony is that the PM did not apparently push for any UK-only protection of the City, but a broader protocol such as the one championed here — which Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel then rejected.

Annals of French Diplomacy

This is scarcely the most important part of today's EU shenanigans but, post DSK and all that, one must admire French diplomatic flair when it comes to this sort of thing: The French are very angry – one French diplomat says that Britain is acting "like a man who wants to go to a wife-swapping party without taking his own wife". Correct or not, this is nicely put. One's hard-pressed to imagine an FCO or State Department suit expressing his frustration in quite such colourful terms. The temptation to make sweeping nationalist generalisations on the back of an off-the-cuff remark such as this should, naturally, be resisted.

The Merkozy Plan fails to convince

A day or so ago, the markets were rising in anticipation of what might be achieved at this Brussels summit. But this morning they're mostly either unmoved, or — as in the case of borrowing costs in Italy and Spain — shifting in unpropitious directions. No-one, it seems, has been won over by yet another night of political bargaineering in Brussels. And understandably so. None of the measures mooted this morning are particularly concrete; all have a sogginess about them. More cash will be transferred to the European Financial Stability Facility, but it's still some distance short of the €1 trillion that was, ahem, ‘announced’ at the end of October.

A defining moment

David Cameron’s use of the veto in the early hours of this morning changes the British political landscape. The first thing to stress is that if the euro collapses it will not be because of the British veto. The deal agreed between the 17 eurozone countries and six of those nations who still want to join it does not address the single currency’s fundamental problems.   What is, perhaps, most intriguing about what happened in the early hours of this morning is that Sarkozy and Merkel chose to put Cameron in this position. In truth, Cameron was not asking for that much. But Sarkozy and Merkel were not prepared to take even small steps to accommodate his concerns. They had clearly decided that they were happy to do a deal at the level of 17-plus rather than 27.

Cameron says ‘No’

It looks like Britain could be heading for renegotiation with the EU sooner rather than later. The UK, Hungary, Czechs and Swedes last night stayed out of a 27-member EU Treaty. ‘I don’t want to put it in front of my parliament,’ said Cameron. But in an historic move, the deal is going ahead anyway, with 23 members: the Eurozone, plus the six states who want to join. ‘We will achieve the new fiscal union,’ said Angela Merkel. Nicholas Sarkozy is upbeat saying it has been an ‘historic summit’ which will change the EU ‘radically’.  If so, then Owen Paterson is right in his interview with James Forsyth in the new Spectator: Britain will have to reassess its relationship with this ‘radically’ different EU.

Cameron’s Europlan comes together

The Tory party may not like it, but David Cameron is now finally following a sensible EU policy. As today's summit in Brussels starts, the Prime Minister appears to have decided what really matters to the UK, and realised that he needs to play nice with the Germans and French. At the top of the PM's priority list — a priority voiced by Michael Howard on the Today Programme earlier — is avoiding the collapse of the euro. The consequences of a collapse on Britain's economy are incalculable, but everyone knows they would be profound. Second comes the protection of the City. A Euroland tax on financial transactions would damage the City and thus Britain (as well as the EU) — avoiding it is key.

Yes, Virginia, History Matters: Eurozone Edition

Broadly speaking, there are two ways of viewing the eurozone crisis: it's a problem of economics or a problem of politics. Neither explanation quite suffices, of course, since it is both but the emphasis you place on economics vs politics plays a part in how you'll view the situation and how likely you are to think there's any kind of solution that can satisfy the politics and the economics of the situation. Which is by way of suggesting that plenty of American commentators seem to think the problem is easy to solve and the main thing lacking in europe is the political will to do something about it. (Exhibit A: James Surowiecki of the New Yorker).

Club Rules, Brussels Edition

Ben Brogan's latest post offers a revealing glimpse into the oddness of the eurosceptic mind. He begins: To the dismay of many of his colleagues preoccupied by the euro crisis, the Prime Minister has been adept at nurturing strong personal relationships with Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy. Instead of confrontation he has engaged constructively with them, to the extent that they listen to him and are willing to consider his attempts to press the British interest. The German chancellor was delighted to discover that Mr Cameron was not the swivel-eyed euro loon she had feared, but a charming and reasonable young man. The French president meanwhile bonded with mon ami Dave over Libya and – pace the odd shouty moment – likes doing business with him.

A tale of two cities | 2 December 2011

Nicolas Sarkozy is grudgingly admired by French socialists as a political fighter, capable of thriving even in the most desperate situation. David Cameron is coming to understand what they mean. It is the best of times and the worst of times between Paris and London. Two months ago, David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy assumed the victor’s garlands in Benghazi; today, they met at odds, if not yet in animosity, over the contested logic of ever closer union in Europe. Sarkozy appears to have got his wish: the 17 countries of the Eurozone will deepen their economic and political relations in an attempt to save the single currency — and with it, he hopes, France’s economic and political strength on the international stage.

Sarko’s renaissance

When David Cameron sits down for lunch with Nicolas Sarkozy today, he is bound to ask his host how the presidential election is going. In response, President Sarkozy is likely to break into one his wide-faced smiles, and begin moving about energetically, as he tends to do when he is excited. Forget the polls that put Francois Hollande ahead in a two-way race. It is too early to tell what people really think and, crucially, it won't be a two-person race. It is a five-person, two-round election. And so far, Sarkozy is doing very well. Besides Sarkozy and Hollande, four other candidates could make a difference to the outcome: Marine Le Pen, François Bayrou, Eva Joly and Jean-Luc Mélenchon.

Tobin tactics

The biggest bone of contention between the UK and its EU allies these days is the ‘Tobin tax’, the idea of levying a tax on financial transactions. To the UK this is folly. Unless it is levied globally, a tax will force business to move elsewhere. And there is a greater chance of Silvio Berlusconi being elected ECB chief than the Tobin tax being levied globally.   Based on the experiences of Sweden in the 1990s, the tax will achieve none of what its proponents believe it will — and at a considerable cost to Britain's and Europe's economy, as companies look to list elsewhere to avoid it. As Ryan Bourne from CPS points out, even the European Commission found that the tax may hurt the economy. The EC thought it could reduce Europe's GDP by up to 1.

How can Cameron protect our interests in Europe in the short term?

Chatting to people in Brussels last week, I couldn't help feeling that David Cameron's EU problem is one of timing. The PM will probably be able to piece together a repatriation package that includes measures such as a withdrawal from the over-implemented Working Time Directive and a reduction in the EU budget. But none of this is likely to be enough for his party. Indeed, I suspect the budget won't be finalised until two minutes to midnight during the Lithuanian EU Presidency in 2013. Add to this the Tobin Tax, where there seems to be little leeway for the British government. Barosso, Merkel and Sarkozy are determined to introduce it, and even a Eurozone-only tax will harm the City.

Chagrin d’amour

The horror of love: Nancy Mitford’s first fiancé was gay; her husband, Peter Rodd, was feckless, spendthrift and unsympathetic, and her great amour, Gaston Palewski, was endlessly unfaithful. She met him during the war in London and was in love with him for the rest of her life. Palewski was Charles de Gaulle’s right-hand man. He organised the French Resistance in London and commanded the Free French forces in East Africa. After the war, he was appointed De Gaulle’s chief of staff and he became known as the sinister éminence grise behind De Gaulle’s presidency. He and Nancy shared a love of France, beauty and jokes.

Britain: a European pariah?

The British government has worked hard to counteract any perception that it is being marginalised in Europe. Before the election, the Tory party went around to different capitals to assuage any fears that may have existed. The message: despite the Conservative departure from the EPP, and their anti-Lisbon Treaty remonstrations, they would not be a problem. They would be businesslike. Once in power, David Cameron unleashed his charm, showcased his polyglot Deputy Prime Minister and sent William Hague out to make everyone feel that they had a partner not a pariah in London. Further, the energetic and amiable David Lidington replaced the combative Mark Francois as Europe Minister.

The new German Question

The Eurocrisis has put Germany in a twofold position that it abhors. First, it has forced Germany into a much closer relationship with France than is comfortable. For German policymakers, the great thing about the post-enlargement EU, of 27 countries, was that they and France could not rule supreme — they needed to bring other states on board. Germany prefers it this way, as it dilutes France's dirigiste instincts. But recent events have reshaped Europe's decision-making system, recreating the pre-1973 model in which Paris and Berlin reigned. The second thing Berlin abhors is to dictate things to others. The catastrophes of the 20th Century forced Germany to remake itself. It is a million miles away from the helmet-wearing caricature.

The Italian domino effect

For all the debate about Theresa May and border security, the big news has not been at Westminster today. Instead, people have been watching what is happening in Italy. For it is far from certain that Europe, or the Western world for that matter, has a bucket bigger enough to bail out a country that owes more than Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain do combined. As the New York Times reports, the European Central Bank is reluctant to step in and start buying Italian bonds because it fears that its previous bond buying efforts have simply enabled the Italians to avoid necessary reforms. It feels that only market pressure will make the Italians actually act. But this is a dangerous game to play because if Italy falls, France will be left teetering on the brink. BNP Paribas has 12.