Jonathan Spyer

Negotiations between the US and Iran over an end to their conflict are ongoing, accompanied by occasional exchanges of fire. In Lebanon, the Iranian proxy group Hezbollah is engaged in daily clashes with Israeli forces. But whatever the outcome of these negotiations, it is possible to reach a conclusion regarding the war launched by the US and Israel on 28 February of this year: the Iranian regime has survived the attack on it and faces no danger of imminent collapse.  This salient fact means that it is necessary to re-examine the basic building blocks of both US and Israeli policy regarding Tehran. It turns out that the Islamic Republic and its alliance of proxies possess greater durability than had been imagined.

President Donald Trump cancelled a planned trip to Islamabad by his envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner over the weekend. The move followed the departure from the Pakistani capital of Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. Following the cancellation, the two sides traded rival accounts of the current state of affairs in their ongoing stand off. Trump, speaking to Fox News, professed himself in no hurry for diplomatic progress, saying that ‘We have all the cards. They can call us anytime they want.’ The US President suggested a version of events in which Teheran, pressured by the US blockade of its tankers in the Strait of Hormuz, was showing increased flexibility regarding the issue of the future of its nuclear programme.

Direct US-brokered talks between Israeli and Lebanese representatives are set to take place in Washington this week. The Israeli delegation will be headed by Yehiel Leiter, Jerusalem’s ambassador to the US. Lebanon will be represented by Nada Hamadeh, the Lebanese ambassador to Washington. The US State Department will host the negotiations. In his statement on Thursday announcing the talks, Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu framed their purpose as ‘‌disarming Hezbollah and establishing peaceful ‌relations between ⁠Israel and ⁠Lebanon'. Lebanese prime minister Nawaf Salam, for his part, expressed his hope that Beirut should become a ‘demilitarised city'.

IDF troops have continued to push further into southern Lebanon this week, encountering determined but not particularly effectual resistance from Hezbollah. But while the Iranian proxy group appears unable to prevent the movement of the IDF on the ground in Lebanon, it is succeeding in launching large amounts of ordnance at Israel from further north. 600 projectiles were launched at Israel over a 24 hour period between Wednesday and Thursday. There was only one fatality thanks to Israel’s air defences and drills.   On the other side, the Lebanese government has reported over 1,000 dead. It doesn’t differentiate between civilian and Hezbollah casualties. Israel says it has killed around 700 Hezbollah fighters.

Israel’s current war on two fronts shows few signs of wrapping up any time soon. In Lebanon, the indications are that the IDF is looking to establish an expanded buffer zone north of the border, with the intention of holding it for as long as the government in Beirut fails to fulfil its pledge to disarm Hezbollah. In Iran, meanwhile, Israeli air attacks are continuing daily, even as Tehran's missiles and drones continue to target Israel’s centres of civilian population. This year is an election year in Israel, with polls required by law to take place by October. So what impact, if any, are the conflicts having on the political debate inside Israel?

Israel launched a limited ground operation in southern Lebanon this week, intended to expand the de facto buffer zone which it has maintained along the border since the ceasefire of November 2024. Following a year of fighting at that time, Israel held control of five positions on the Lebanese side of the border. In response to Hezbollah’s decision to re-engage with Israel in the context of the current conflict between Jerusalem and Tehran, the IDF is pushing further into Lebanon.   As of now, Israel is bombing Hezbollah targets throughout the country. Ground forces, meanwhile, are cautiously pushing forward. According to Israeli media reports, the IDF’s goal is to establish 13 additional positions north of the border.

Israeli aircraft struck targets in Lebanon on Monday. Hezbollah and Hamas military infrastructure was targeted in the Hezbollah heartland of the Beka’a, and in Hatta and Aanan villages in the south of the country, according to a Israel Defense Forces (IDF) spokesman. The Israeli strikes came days after the expiry of the 31 December deadline set for the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to complete the disarmament of Hezbollah south of the Litani River. This runs according to the terms of the ceasefire agreement which ended the last war between Israel and the Iran-supported Shia Islamist militia in November 2024. The LAF has predictably failed to complete its mission. No one in Israel expected otherwise.

The killing of Lebanese Hezbollah military chief Haytham Ali Tababtabai by Israel this week reflects how much the balance of power between Jerusalem and the Iran-backed Shia Islamist group has shifted since the year-long war between the two in 2023 and 2024. Yet, paradoxically, Tabatabai’s killing also shows that nothing has been finally settled between the two enemies. While Hezbollah has now been shown to be much weaker than Israel, it nevertheless remains stronger than any internal faction in Lebanon, including the official Lebanese government.

As the Gaza ceasefire struggles into its second month, a significant difference between the position of Israel and that of its chief ally, the United States, on the way forward is emerging. This difference reflects broader gaps in perception in Jerusalem and Washington regarding the nature and motivations of the current forces engaged in the Middle East. The subject of that difference is Turkey.   The Turks have expressed a desire to play a role in the ‘international stabilisation force’ (ISF), which, according to President Donald Trump’s 20-point plan, is supposed to take over ground security control of Gaza from the IDF (and Hamas) in the framework of the plan’s implementation.