Daniel Korski

Colonel Ghadaffi wants a cease fire. Fine, but Western governments should insist that the no-fly zone still comes into force; that a new UN resolution is drafted to specify cantoment areas for his forces; and that a UN-mandated Arab Leage but NATO-enabled interpositional force is deployed to ensure the ceasefire holds, perhaps with an Egyptian officer as the head working in tandem with the UN and EU envoys to kickstart a political process. Finally, the West should lend massive support to the "free republic" of Benghazi - economic, military and so on. That is the kind of ceasefire the West can accept. Not a ploy that aims to pick the weakest link of the coalition, the United States, away from the policy, but robust action that sees David Cameron's strategy through to the end.

If you find yourself on the same side of an issue as Iran, it is wise to think carefully what path you have chosen to walk. Today, an Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman condemned the foreign military intervention in Bahrain to confront the protests as "unacceptable." To my dismay, I agree with what Tehran says; but, I suspect (and hope), for very different reasons. The grievances driving the Bahraini protests stem from years of discrimination by the Sunni elite of the Shia majority. Evidence of the problem is well-documented. Last year, Amnesty said that the Bahraini authorities had “failed to investigate alleged torture of detainees”.

From the moment David Cameron started agitating for a no fly-zone, he's been looking for allies. France and Denmark look like they will support him, with Russia and India opposed and China perhaps willing to abstain at the United Nations. But what about closer to home, inside the coalition? Since the formation of the coalition, every policy has been tested by what will it do for relations between the parties? Oddly, however, there has been no such test about Libyan policy. Newspapers have not been writing about splits, differences and agreements. That may be because Lord Ashdown went on the Today Programme and voiced conditional support for a no-fly zone. But the Lib Dem peer has always been a hawk.

The government has been damaged by its response to the Libyan crisis and the SAS incident in particular. William Hague has been branded a 'serial bungler', and the FCO’s response was condemned as slow and ill-prepared. The consensus is that heads should roll at King Charles Street. Many commentators have also argued that the Prime Minister was too quick to call for a no-fly zone over Libya. Nobody, not even government loyalists, could argue that the last few weeks have been David Cameron’s finest.   However, one can be too critical. Let’s start with the SAS mission. Something obviously went wrong, but it is hard to believe that ministers could have done anything differently. Their job is to set direction, not to micromanage operations.

Following the events in the Middle East, I have proposed a democracy review of UK bilateral relations and former Europe minister Denis MacShane has suggested that David Cameron set up a Foundation for Democracy Development in the Middle East and North Africa to "provide an all-party source of income, travel grants, and overseas seminars" It would make sense, I think, to do both in succession, starting with the review and then creating a new body that can undertake the work. However, instead of creating a UK-only organisation, the government should build on the links established with Turkey's government and set up a joint endeavour, chaired by William Hague and Ahmet Davatoglu, the Foreign Secretary's counterpart.

The Foreign Office has come in for a lot of criticism lately, following delays in getting Britons out Libya. Some argue that it is all William Hague's fault. Others that the department is unfit for purpose. Both of these views seem a bit unfair. The FCO managed to help Britons in Tunisia and Egypt, and only came up short when the company they had used failed to take off for Libya. True, there should have been a better contract in place – which would give the FCO alternatives – but that hardly translates into systemic failure. True, ministerial divisions between Jeremy Browne, in charge of consular affairs, and Alistair Burt, who runs Middle East policy, did not help. But that's probably inevitable.

I've spent ten minutes reading the same passage and still don't understand what it means. It comes from Harriet Harman, quoted in the Independent, criticising the government's Libya strategy: "The response to the terrible events in Libya has been a shambles. The key to their shambolic response lies in their ideology. If your perspective is that government is a bad thing and you want less of it, you're not going to be on the front foot when the power of government is exactly what is needed." Do you get it? Is the Labour MP saying that her party would have harnessed the power of the state, principally the military, and ordered the bombing of Libya?

Government is about choices. In opposition you can like anything, support any measure, back any proposal. But when in office you either make choices or invite dismissal. So when International Development Secretary Andrew Mitchell looked at Britain's development spending he was determined to make choices. Now that he has, some people don't like it. Not one bit. They like choices in general, much as they accept a theoretical form of cuts; but they recoil from real ones. Former Europe Minister Denis MacShane is one of the choice-avoiders. Writing in the New Statesman, he rails about cutting funds to the International Labour Organisation, seeing a Tory plot to undermine trade unionism.