Russia

As the annual G7 Summit kicks off in Canada, President Trump told reporters that removing President Vladimir Putin from the group was a mistake, and had they not done so, the Kremlin's over two-year war against Ukraine would not have happened. "They threw Russia out, which I claimed was a very big mistake, even though I wasn’t in politics then. I was very loud about it," Trump said. He reasoned, "You spend so much time talking about Russia, and he’s no longer at the table. So it makes it more complicated – but you wouldn’t have had the war." Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney appeared somewhat disengaged next to Trump and gazed off into the distance when Trump said the war would have never happened.

The Trump-Putin honeymoon is over. After three months of lengthy one-on-one phone calls, a handful of false starts on negotiations and flashes of Trumpian boosterism over the prospect of great commercial deals with the Kremlin, a fourth summer of war in Ukraine looks inevitable. Vladimir Putin will pretend to negotiate, while at the same time continuing to pound Ukraine’s cities with missiles and pressing forward on the ground. The Ukrainians will continue to scramble for men and resources with which to defend themselves. And the White House will continue to blame both sides for not reaching a deal. Over these three months of false hope, Putin has made two things very clear.

For the most part, President Trump hasn’t had to worry too much about the loyalty of his fellow Republicans on Capitol Hill. Sure, he needed to make a trip to the other side of Pennsylvania Avenue to pressure a few Republican holdouts to support his “big, beautiful” package of tax cuts and spending cuts, but the rank-and-file has tended to blindly follow whatever the White House wants.  Yet over the last several days, a slight divide has emerged between Trump and Republicans – or more specifically, Trump and Senate Republicans – on Ukraine and Russia policy.

Ceasefire then talks, or talks then ceasefire? This has emerged as one of the pivotal issues in the diplomacy around the war in Ukraine, even if one could question just how genuine both sides are in their respective positions. The proposed talks in Istanbul on Thursday may help clarify matters, but both sides seem more committed to appeasing the White House than talking peace. On Saturday, the usual suspects of Europe – the leaders of the UK, France, Germany and Poland – met in Kyiv and demanded Vladimir Putin call an immediate 30-day ceasefire, on pain of further sanctions. The usual pattern for peace talks is indeed a cessation of hostilities first, talks later, but there was no serious plan for negotiations in that span.

It was an emollient J.D. Vance who showed up at the Munich Leaders Meeting in Washington, DC. Gone was the Vance who dissed the Europeans in Munich on February 15 by complaining that they were practicing censorship of political views and who met with a representative of the far-right Alternative für Deutschland party. Gone was the Cerberus who barked at Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on the Oval Office on February 24 that he had exhibited a dismaying lack of gratitude toward America for its assistance to his beleaguered nation. Gone was the Ohio senator who declared in July 2024 that he didn’t give a fig about Ukraine’s fate and was more interested in pursuing an Asia First policy.

The US general Mark Clark knew a thing or two about dealing with Russians. In the aftermath of the defeat of Nazi Germany, Clark commanded the American occupying forces in Austria. His Soviet opposite number, and nominal ally, was Marshal Ivan Konev. The two war heroes were tasked with pacifying the conquered and divided country at the dawn of the Cold War. ‘The Russians were not interested in teamwork,’ recalled Clark in his 1950 memoir, Calculated Risk. ‘They wanted to keep things boiling… They were accustomed to the use of force. They were skilled in exploiting any sign of weakness or uncertainty or appeasement. This was their national policy.’ Two things infuriated Clark more than anything.

One hundred days into the second Donald Trump presidency, his presence in the Oval Office represents the largest sea change in US foreign relations since the end of the Cold War.  Within the space of fewer than four months, Trump has forced Ukraine to deal with reality, by delivering hard truths about what ending the war will require. He has deployed J.D. Vance to shock the international system, with tough messages to our allies in Europe and Asia. Trump’s declaration of a litany of cartels as foreign terror organizations has kicked off a redirection of our relationship with Mexico, Panama and the Western hemisphere. His close relationship with Israel, a clear break with Joe Biden’s approach, has shifted expectations for the Middle East.

Friday morning, Lieutenant General Yaroslav Moskalik was heading out from his flat in Balashikha, a commuter town east of Moscow, when a car bomb exploded, killing him. There can be little doubt this is an operation by Ukrainian intelligence, another example of their capacity to launch skilful targeted assassinations in the heart of Russia. But will it actually change anything? That is more doubtful. It is hard not to assume this was another killing by the Ukrainians Moskalik was not a high-profile figure, but as deputy head of the General Staff’s Main Operations Directorate (GOU), he was a capable officer and potentially on a career track for even higher office.

Washington, DC My office this week has been the Starbucks on Capitol Hill. Any random subscriber to my Substack can get a half-hour with me if they book a slot. I do this a lot when I travel and oddly, given the rot of this rotting world, I rarely come away with the feeling that here were 30 precious minutes I’ll never see again. I often want to spend an hour or two. And no one yet has killed or even attacked me. A leftist policy wonk did show up without an appointment, but he just wanted to talk about Ezra Klein. One of this week’s characters was a Russia expert at a foreign policy thinktank, who seems to really know his stuff. He filled in important nuances ofthe Prigozhin coup. Yevgeny Prigozhin never meant to overthrow Vladimir Putin, he said.