Charlie Gammell

‘They are scared. You can hear it in their voices,’ someone wrote to me on Friday from Tehran. And in this case the ‘they’ is what’s left of the Iranian military and intelligence commanders. And perhaps Khamenei, too (strikingly absent from the air waves since a speech on Friday morning). Israel’s strikes, yet another show of tactical brilliance from the ever-resourceful Mossad, stunned the Islamic Republic in a brutal display of military and intelligence superiority. Iran is quite simply reeling, and the only question now is how far will Israel go, and to what end? Who, if anyone, will pick up the pieces of a broken Islamic Republic?

To enrich or not enrich? This seems to have been the question dividing Iranian and American negotiators, and there are swelling choruses in Tehran and Washington who hold strong views on the matter. In a report leaked to Axios, it appears that during the last round of talks, the US gave Iran a proposal that would allow limited low-level uranium enrichment for a specified period. The proposal suggested that Iran would be forbidden from building new enrichment facilities and must dismantle “critical infrastructure for conversion and processing of uranium,” adding that research and development on centrifuges would also have to stop. Sanctions relief will only come once Iran is demonstrably adhering to the terms of the deal and has clearly paused its underground enrichment activities.

After the cautious optimism of the early rounds of US-Iran talks, and Donald Trump’s Gulf roadshow, the US government has claimed that Israel is preparing for a possible strike on Iranian nuclear facilities, a parallel piece of political theatre to the ongoing talks between US and Iranian negotiators.  This is nothing new. B-52 bombers and Israeli fighter jets have been rehearsing this for the past few months, and many years before that. This is some very public cold water being poured on the talks, just as they set to advance to the complicated bit. Aware that there is every chance the talks may not progress beyond these thorny rounds, both sides are preparing the ground for that failure.

As the world reels from the chaos of a geopolitical order turned upside down, and as we wait to see if America really will invade Canada, spare a thought for Tehran. Losing one ally in the space of 12 months (Hezbollah) is bad enough. But losing two (Syria) is downright terrible. And then add to the mix the prosect of losing a third (Russia) as Moscow contemplates sacrificing the Islamic Republic on the altar of Putin’s pivot towards Donald Trump, and you have a really, really bad few months. Tehran can’t work out which way is up. Recently, the regime fired two senior politicians, who would have been likely to negotiate with Donald Trump’s team on the ever thorny issue of Iran’s nuclear programme. When in doubt, the regime reverts to type – mistrusting the West.

In 2012, as the Islamic Republic showed signs of buckling under the weight of US and EU sanctions, Senator John Kerry spearheaded a series of backchannel meetings with his Iranian counterparts to begin exploring the deal that became the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), an arms reduction agreement between Iran and western nations in which Iran would receive sanctions relief in exchange for caps on uranium enrichment. The US and its allies sought to strike a bargain with an Islamic Republic desperate for foreign investment, eager to accept terms.

Sun Tzu, the Chinese military strategist writing roughly 2,500 years ago, said that ‘Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory. Tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat.’ As we stand on the precipice of a truly frightening regional conflict, which pits a technologically advanced Israel and its allies against Iran and its allies in a war of asymmetry, this tension between strategy and tactics will be a crucial determinant of whether this war ever ends.  We are in an escalatory spiral of tactical exchanges, with both sides aiming for that elusive sweet spot of striking a blow so forceful that it deters the other side from further action, but not so forceful that it provokes a regional war.

Not only does the death of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, in a helicopter crash in the fog and mountains in northern Iran, necessitate an election within 50 days, it has also removed the likely front-runner to replace Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei.  Anyone hoping for a revolution will probably be disappointed Raisi was an attractive candidate because, as much as Khamenei himself was thrust into the role in 1989 due to his supposed weakness, a lack of a power base and a generally malleable profile, Raisi presented similarly: a loyal yes man unlikely to rock the boat and inclined to do as told. In a power transition from Khamenei to post-Khamenei, watched over by the all-powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), these were good qualities.

We’ve been here before. Iran has been here before. In 2020 its most senior IRGC commander, Qassem Soleimani, was killed in a US air strike on his convoy as they drove out of Baghdad airport. Soleimani was a much mythologised figure across the Middle East, famed for his ability to direct Iran’s regional proxies to do Tehran’s bidding. The world held its breath in anticipation of a terrifying response, a global war, commensurate with the purple prose coming out of Tehran’s military and political organs. And yet not a huge amount happened, save for a few desultory missiles being shot into the middle distance of northern Iraq. And the shooting down of an Iranian passenger plane by the IRGC.