The missiles and bombs may have stopped, at least for the moment, but the war between the US and Iran continues. The Strait of Hormuz remains closed, the US sanctions remain in place, and the fundamental issues separating the combatants remain unresolved. The bilateral negotiations have gone nowhere, and the two sides remain far apart.
This stalemate has puzzled observers since it’s not hard to see the outlines of a deal. For Iran, the minimum acceptable goal is regime survival. For the US, it is the end of the Iranian nuclear program, which poses an existential threat to America’s regional partners and, eventually, to Europe and South Asia. Since the regime’s survival and the end of its nuclear program are compatible goals, a deal should be possible. Once that deal is done, the Strait would reopen.
If such a deal is possible in theory, why hasn’t it happened in practice?
The short answer is that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corp, which now controls the country, refuses to give up its more ambitious goals.
What are those larger goals? There are at least three beyond the regime’s survival. Building its own nuclear weapons, developing a stockpile of missiles to deliver them, and supporting proxy forces, which extend the regime’s power across the Middle East and preoccupy its enemies.
Since those larger goals are intolerable for the Trump administration, negotiations will fail as long as the Iranians refuse to budge.
America’s regional partners share Trump’s resistance to Tehran’s demands. In fact, Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) go further, believing it is impossible to tolerate the continuation of the Iranian regime. The problem, they have concluded, is not any particular negotiating item; it is the regime’s basic character and the on-going threat it poses to their safety.
The Israelis reached that conclusion long ago and have plenty of experience to back it up. What’s new is the changed view of Arab Gulf states. They didn’t take kindly to being bombed by Tehran. The Iranian weapon turned out to be a boomerang. Tehran thought its coercive measures would produce compliance. They had the opposite effect. The shelling hardened the Gulf States’ resistance and strengthened their strategic ties to both America and Israel.
Important as these allies are to America, they do not control what the Trump administration seeks or what it is willing to do. Those decisions are made in Washington, advancing America’s national security as the Trump administration sees it.
That central point is missing from the rising tide of virulent, anti-Semitic commentary, which blames the Jews for this war and, indeed, for any events and policies they don’t like. For them, it’s all one giant, malignant conspiracy.
What’s a hard truth, not an invented conspiracy, is the profound danger the Islamic Republic of Iran poses to its neighbors and the West. It is a regime founded on millenarian dreams, determined to exterminate apostates at home and abroad, and willing to devote its considerable oil wealth to that extremist project. It has done exactly that since 1979, when the Islamists seized power.
In pursuing those dreams, Iran has held fast to its most ambitious goals, despite the horrific punishment it has suffered. As soon as the 12-Day War ended, it began rebuilding its lost military capabilities. Now, after another bombing campaign eliminated its leaders, decimated its military, and choked its economy, it continues to resist any compromise deal. It refuses to “swallow the poison pill,” as Ayatollah Khomeini called the compromise peace with Iraq after eight years of fighting.
Why the refusal to compromise this time?
The answer is that Iran’s hardline leaders believe they can not only survive as a regime by continuing the fight, they believe they can still achieve their larger goals. Why? Because they believe they can outlast the Americans.
As evidence of their own persistence, the Iranians look past the destruction they have suffered and see what they have survived: the Twelve-Day War, the domestic uprisings in mid-winter, two massive US-Israeli bombing campaigns, the death of the Supreme Leader, and the annihilation of regime’s top layers of military and clerical leaders. After these successive blows, they are now absorbing catastrophic economic punishment as the US Navy blocks their oil exports and, with them, almost all Iran’s foreign currency earnings. And through it all, the regime has survived.
Ah, but for how long? That is the overriding question in what has become a war of attrition. Who can last longest? The cumulative blows to Iran are undoubtedly strangling the regime, but they are working slowly. That pace of destruction and the regime’s ability to withstand it are crucial factors in any war of attrition.
In such wars, the winner is the side that can withstand pain longer – and convince the other that it can do so. So, we need to ask: Which side has that edge? What constraints does each side face? What can each do to overcome those limits?
For Iran, the looming vulnerability is the regime’s lack of funds to pay its repressive apparatus. True, the regime’s hard-core supporters in the IRGC and paramilitary will keep fighting, even if they aren’t paid. Their incentive goes beyond their religious-ideological zealotry. It is personal survival. They can easily envision an enraged mob coming to kill them after the regime falls. With no safe haven for escape, they will keep fighting to the bitter end. They have the guns and incentives to do it, and they may have regional enclaves within Iran to serve as bases for resistance.
That calculus does not apply to the foreign fighters hired to control the streets. If those Islamist Arab militias aren’t paid, they will pack up and go home. Their payments are now at risk, thanks to America’s oil embargo. Without those foreign fighters, the regime will face a much tougher task of suppressing popular discontent, which is rising amid hyperinflation, a disintegrating economy, and shortages of food and water.
That grim scenario still does not ensure the regime will fall since the IRGC and local Basij militia are well-armed and ruthless. They have already shown they are willing and able to kill civilian demonstrators by the thousands. The public may hate the regime, but they also fear another murderous onslaught if they take to the streets. So, they wait for an opportune moment.
The unanswered question is how long the regime can sustain this “quiet of the graveyard”? As long as the regime believes it can deter (or suppress) any uprising and pay the essential elements of war and repression, it will cling to its larger goals: nuclear arms, delivery systems, and proxy networks. As long as it believes it can outlast American pressure and domestic discontent, it won’t swallow the poison pill. So far, that’s what the regime’s leaders believe. They believe time is on their side, so they refuse to make major concessions. Those who believe otherwise have been fired from the negotiating team.
For the Trump administration, the clock ticks with a different rhythm. The alarm bell is set for early September, when voters typically make their decisions for the November election. Right now, those decisions don’t look good for Republicans, partly because of inflation, partly because of the war. Polls show the public is not convinced America needs to fight this war. They don’t see a national security interest worth the cost, and they are none too pleased with war’s progress. They see the successful bombing and economic sanctions but not a successful political outcome.
The longer the war continues, the worse for Republicans. That may not matter much for keeping control of the House of Representatives since Republicans were never expected to keep the majority there. But it could matter for the Senate, which Republicans currently control but could lose.
This combination of electoral pressure, the inability to strike a negotiated deal, and the ensuing political stalemate may push the Trump administration to resume “kinetic action,” the euphemism for bombing. The twin goals would be to kill the regime’s leadership, once again, and wipe out the small boats and short-range missiles that imperil marine traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. (The US has already begun clearing undersea mines, but the Iranians could always try to lay more until the small boats are destroyed.)
Beyond that, the US could easily take out Iran’s bridges, power plants, and oil terminals, but it has hesitated to do so because the damage would cripple any post-IRGC regime, if the people did rise up and overthrow the thugs now in power.
The obvious problem with any renewed American bombing is Iranian retaliation, primarily against oil facilities across the Gulf. Although those states have restocked their missile defenses, they are limited and imperfect. That means Iranian missiles and drones are likely to hit key oil facilities, spike prices, and threaten a global recession. And, of course, oil tankers can’t move through the Strait while the missiles are flying.
Despite these risks, the Trump administration may be unwilling to wait for economic sanctions to undermine the regime. It may want to move faster. If Washington does resume bombing, it is unlikely to accept the current regime’s hold on power. It will want to “finish the job,” as the war hawks have urged all along.
Going for regime change is not an easy sell for voters or policymakers. It evokes bitter memories of long, costly, unsuccessful wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The problem is not overthrowing the old rulers. The harder problem is standing up a new regime – and keeping it standing without a long-term occupying force. Whether to start down that rocky, winding path is the formidable question facing Donald Trump. It is the biggest decision of his presidency.
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