My 2016 novel The Mandibles ends in 2047. Young people save what little the state allows them to keep to buy space in stacked, mausoleum-style units, where in a chemically induced slumber they can cheaply dream away whole years of their lives. In a wry nod to my earlier novel We Need to Talk About Kevin, the pervasive social contagion is no longer school shootings but mass murders in nursing homes, because so many twentysomethings have been pushed over the edge by resentment of a massive elderly population sucking this cohort dry. My working-age characters toil at three different jobs, while a chip at the nape of their necks neatly subtracts most of their wages in taxes, largely to fund geriatric medical care.
That vision was borne of my longstanding fascination with demography, the world’s most secretly-not-really-boring science. It’s befuddling that popular focus on ageing populations is so recent because demographers saw the slow-motion train wreck coming decades ago. The below-replacement fertility that has sheared hulking corners off the traditional age-structure pyramid has been sustained in most of Europe for 50 years.
Published last week, Paul Morland and Philip Pilkington’s Bust: The Economics of Population Decline lays out the alarming macro consequences of persistently tiny or nonexistent families. The pair propose that economics once dictated demography; now demography dictates economics. (Bottom line: no people, no economy. South Korea is in danger of losing three-fifths of its population this century, and that’s assuming its fertility rate nearly doubles.) Having generated their share of despair, the authors then attempt manfully to commend remedies – though, as so often in doomster nonfiction, the dire prophesies are more persuasive than the solutions.
A groaningly top-heavy age structure means too many crusties supported by too few overburdened workers like my 2047 characters. Bust convincingly portrays the competition for resources that’s already under way between the generations as zero-sum. (They may not think they’re up in arms about demography, but the young nihilists rioting on the Continent this autumn are to a large degree angry about age structure.) The pressure on pension systems is already severe and getting worse. Taxation is already oppressive and will only grow more so. Healthcare costs will keep rising. Labour shortages lead to wage hikes lead to higher prices. The concentration of capital among the retired is also inflationary, as way too much money chasing too few assets drives up their cost. This asset inflation is already shutting younger people out of property ownership and driving them to make blind foolhardy stabs at earning money through cryptocurrencies and sports betting. As the high-voter-turnout elderly increase in number, so does their political power to shuttle public monies in their direction.
The subsequent animosity among younger cohorts could be incendiary – as it is already, literally so, in Europe. Bust warns that the workforce may either resolve to ‘starve the older population of resources or to engage in some sort of mandatory euthanasia campaign… By failing to value the creation of new life, we are going to end up devaluing all life.’
Ask many a younger person why they’ve either forsworn or put off having children, and they’ll reliably explain that it’s because they can’t afford to buy their own home. This is rubbish. It appears there’s zero correlation between house prices or home ownership and fertility. I’m always fascinated by the mysteries of self-awareness. Morland and Pilkington claim that folks who blame unaffordable housing for foot-dragging on family formation ‘are simply wrong’. I’d say the same of blaming climate change: lofty-sounding but no more emotionally credible than choosing parenthood to improve your nation’s dependency ratio.
A shrinking labour force is a beloved justification for mass immigration. Yet in 2024 only 12 per cent of UK visas were issued primarily for work, betraying that leaky border policies are often less economic than ideological. Bust dismisses this standard short-term fix as a Ponzi scheme. Immigrants get old, too, and soon adapt to a host country’s fertility rates. The nationalities keenest to migrate are likely to be low-skilled and to become net drains on the public purse. The sheer mathematical scale of the immigration required to make up for all those missing babies is so enormous that the subsequent ethnic transformation of western countries would be political poison, and the scale we’ve got is already political poison.
The authors propose that economics once dictated demography; now demography dictates economics
So what to do? Asserting that financial incentives to procreate might raise fertility by about 9 per cent (not much, but better than nothing), Morland and Pilkington are more optimistic than most demographers about the efficacy of pro-natalist tax breaks, baby bonds and subsidised childcare, as historically bribing women to get pregnant hasn’t worked. The authors also encourage sex-ed classes to teach that female fertility declines after 30 and that IVF is less successful than most people think, not merely how to prevent pregnancy and disease. I would add: how about letting up on the celebration of sexual practices that don’t make babies, not to mention ceasing to push children ‘in the wrong body’ to later sterilise themselves.
Poor people in the 19th century living in cramped accommodation with no wifi opted for large families. Low fertility is down to that fat, blobby concept of ‘culture’. It sounds circular, but culture is indeed a feedback loop: we marry older or not at all and delay childbearing until it’s too late because everyone else marries older or not at all and delays childbearing until it’s too late. We think we’ve abolished norms altogether, but we just have different norms – such as it’s now totally normal not to reproduce. (Hypocrisy alert: I didn’t have kids myself.) Culture is notoriously difficult to shift from the top down. Nevertheless, Bust urges governments to go gung-ho on pro-family PR.
Were I to do my own cultural part, should my next novel be an anti-Kevin? Whose cast exclusively sponsors talented, affectionate, charming children who bring humour and delight to the dinner table, while providing their parents with enduring joy, meaning and purpose? Jeez, try selling that proposal to HarperCollins.
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