In today’s world, no geopolitical deal is without controversy. President Trump’s recent deal with Vladimir Putin to import an initial 300,000 tonnes of Russian diesel is no exception. For its critics, the agreement is one more example of Trump’s claim that ‘the tougher and meaner [world leaders] are’, the better his relationships with them. At the same time, the disruption to crude oil supplies and resultant hike in global fuel prices have meant that for some, importing from Russia is the only option.
The implications of this deal, however, go far beyond Washington and Europe. We must not forget Washington’s East Asian ally south of one of the world’s most heavily militarised borders, the Demilitarised Zone, namely South Korea.
The ongoing US-Iran war has had ripple effects far beyond the Gulf. In the United States, rising energy prices will be one of several sticking points as November’s midterm elections draw near. Whether Russia can provide enough diesel to have a significant impact on lowering US costs, however, remains to be seen. But 7,000 miles away from Washington, Seoul is also feeling the pinch. 70 per cent of its crude oil imports come from the Middle East. Nearly 99 per cent of all of South Korea’s Middle Eastern oil shipments flow through the Strait of Hormuz. After Iran closed the waterway on 28 February, South Korea’s gasoline and diesel prices rose by 10 per cent and 16 per cent respectively.
Neither friend nor foe is spared from Washington’s transactional diplomacy
The US-Russia diesel deal raises key geopolitical questions. One of the reasons behind Trump’s decision to sign the agreement could have been the US’s need to inch Russia away from its ally of North Korea and friend of China. The threats facing the US no longer simply emanate from individual enemies but a solidifying coalition of authoritarian actors: China, Russia, North Korea and Iran. By bringing into his fold the man whom he claims wants a peace deal to end the Ukraine war, Trump could have hoped that Putin would realise the errors of his ways. As tens of thousands of North Korean troops look to be deployed to assist the Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine – in addition to the 15,000 already dispatched – could the deal lead to a slow divorce of Russia from North Korea? We must remember that Russia, as North Korea, wants to benefit both from its deal with the US and its relations with American adversaries.
The diesel deal is only going to complicate existing problems for South Korea at a time when the country’s left-leaning president, Lee Jae-myung, has (not for the first time) found himself on a self-inflicted sticky wicket. At last month’s United Nations General Assembly, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky announced that two North Korean soldiers – captured fighting for Russia – had been transferred to South Korea. In response, Lee accused Ukraine of breaking a non-disclosure agreement and public humiliation. Lee also chose to prolong the spat by recalling South Korea’s ambassador to Kyiv.
South Korea’s complaints are absurd. Since taking office in June last year, President Lee has doggedly sought to reconcile South Korea’s relations with the North, for all Pyongyang’s repeated assertions that doing so is futile. Lee’s objections – whether out of true belief or as a way of placating leftist constituents in his government and voter base – will hardly help with his ambitions for reconciliation, however unrealistic they may be. More fundamentally, South Korea’s constitution underscores how North Koreans are legally considered to be South Korean citizens, since the South views the North as its own territory. Lee ‘s self-styled ‘pragmatism’ seems anything but.
For South Korea, the Russia problem is nothing new. Across conservative and progressive governments ever since the Ukraine war began, South Korea has refused to provide Kyiv with lethal assistance, not least to avoid compromising Seoul’s economic ties with Moscow.
Before the war, Russia was South Korea’s tenth-largest trading partner. Plans for economic cooperation were not lacking, whether a railway connecting South and North Korea to Russia, or a gas pipeline supplying Russian natural gas to South Korea, going through the North. When South Korea faced the wrath of Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz earlier this year, it resumed imports of naphtha from Russia. More recently, unconfirmed reports raised the possibility that over 175,000 tonnes of fuel left South Korean ports for Russia in July and August.
Time will tell as to whether this week’s diesel agreement proves that Putin has mastered the art of the deal or if the status quo continues. But one thing is for sure: North Korea’s behaviour is only worsening. The US-Russia diesel deal will not stop Moscow from supplying Pyongyang with crude oil, humanitarian assistance, and, most concerningly, missile and military technology. Seoul should not overlook this grim reality. What is more, recent claims by the US Ambassador to China, David Perdue, that President Trump offered to sell arms to China during Xi Jinping’s visit to the White House – however true – throws yet another factor into the mix.
The lesson from the diesel deal, therefore, is not that the US is abandoning its East Asian allies but that neither friend nor foe is spared from Washington’s transactional diplomacy. Just as President Trump seeks to satisfy domestic audiences, South Korean president Lee Jae-myung must recognise that sulking at Ukraine whilst attempting to court North Korea will bring neither security nor leverage. Seoul may be 4,000 miles from Tehran, but on the Korean Peninsula, as in the Gulf, cheap fuel is no substitute for security.
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