The Strategic Defence Review (SDR), published a year ago and meant to be the fundamental framework of the government’s defence policy, was not a faultless document. On one issue at least, though, it was very clear: the United Kingdom’s steadfast commitment to Nato should be the primary focus of its strategic posture.
The primacy of the alliance was emphasised so often it almost felt like subliminal suggestion. Keir Starmer’s foreword promised Britain would ‘lead in Nato’; the Defence Secretary John Healey said ‘our defence policy is “Nato First’”, referred to ‘our unshakeable commitment to Nato’ and pledged to ‘provide leadership in Nato’. Meanwhile, the SDR’s authors said that ‘Nato is the bedrock of our defence’ and ‘at the forefront of the UK’s many valuable alliances’. ‘Nato First’ was labelled ‘the defining principle of this review’.
I labour the point because the reality is not just the government falling some way short of its grand rhetoric and ambitious aspirations. The UK is failing very seriously in its commitments to Nato. The government’s actions, rather than its words, make defence policy look almost like ‘Nato last’, the SDR reflected in a funhouse mirror.
UK defence policy is currently a parody of ‘Nato First’
Nato has reportedly compiled a league table ranking member states according to how far they are meeting their rearmament promises. It may be published by the end of the month, but British ministers should pray that Nato is as bad at producing documents on time as the government is: this league table makes jaw-droppingly grim reading.
The UK is ranked 31st out of the alliance’s 32 member states. It sits above only Iceland, which, do not forget, does not have standing armed forces; it relies on the Icelandic coast guard, which comprises four ships, and elements of the 750-strong National Police.
Defence spending offers Britain little solace. As a percentage of GDP, the UK was only the 12th largest spender of 32 in 2025, with 2.5 per cent going to defence. Next year it will increase by 0.2 per cent to 2.7 per cent, still slightly under the Nato average and far short of countries like Poland (4.3 per cent), Lithuania (4 per cent) and Norway (3.2 per cent). Starmer’s government has an ‘ambition’ to reach 3 per cent in the next parliament. It is bound by the agreement reached at the Nato summit in the Hague in June last year to spend 3.5 per cent on ‘core defence requirements’ and an additional 1.5 per cent on wider national security and resilience by 2035. How on earth will the UK achieve this?
The government has yet to publish its Defence Investment Plan, promised for autumn 2025, but it seems unlikely it will prove a silver bullet: the main reason it is so badly delayed is because of disagreements between the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and HM Treasury – which Starmer seems oddly incapable of resolving – over how much additional expenditure it will contain. The MoD is believed to hope for around £18 billion over four years, while the Treasury’s opening gambit was £12 billion. The capability gap between commitments and resources is of the order of £28 billion.
It is deeply concerning that the armed forces are so diminished that they cannot perform some basic functions. Currently all five of the Royal Navy’s Astute-class attack submarines are in port and unable to deploy; at least one and possibly two of the four Vanguard-class ballistic missile submarines, which provide continuous at-sea deterrence, are unavailable. The Royal Air Force has yet to put the first of its expected three Boeing E-7 Wedgetail AEW1 airborne early warning aircraft into service, and its predecessor, the E-3 Sentry, was retired five years ago. We have enormous gaps in what we can do.
But this is also about a much wider issue, which is the UK’s reputation as a reliable and capable ally. Setting aside the hyperbole about ‘leading in Nato’, Britain is not even pulling its weight. If Nato faced a full-scale conflict in the near future, we would let our allies down. Currently the 3rd (UK) Armoured Division is expected to form part of a Strategic Reserve Corps, but it is being restructured around three vehicle types: the Challenger 3 main battle tank, the Ajax armoured fighting vehicle and the Boxer mechanised infantry vehicle.
Neither Challenger 3 nor Ajax is in service, and Boxer is only at initial operating capability. 3rd Division is not deployable in the way that Nato expects. General Sir Richard Barrons, one of the authors of the SDR, recently said the British Army would only be able to ‘seize a small market town on a good day’.
The multibillionaire investor Warren Buffett likes to say that ‘it takes 20 years to build a reputation and five minutes to ruin it’. John Gay was more lyrical but more definitive: ‘A lost good name is ne’er retriev’d.’ Britain’s armed forces are at that inflection point. Your friends will forgive occasional failings, but they cannot be expected to overlook being let down repeatedly with an utter absence of contrition or admission of culpability.
UK defence policy is currently a parody of ‘Nato First’. We are not fulfilling our commitments; we are not being honest about it and it is hard to see how we will be able to match them in the near future. Our allies have already noticed. Britain’s good name, which genuinely existed, is very close to being lost, after which, we know, it is ne’er retriev’d.
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