Mark Galeotti

It seems conventional wisdom by now that the public can only be convinced by hyperbole. As Nato Secretary-General Mark Rutte implies that Britain faces a choice between the NHS and Russian conquest, it is worth asking how much this actually damages democracy – and helps Vladimir Putin? The real threat Russia poses is less of direct military action but through its ‘hybrid war’ instruments of subversion and division Rutte is on tour in a bid to sell the new orthodoxy that Nato member states – many of whom barely, if at all, hit the previous target of spending 2 per cent of GDP on defence – must commit to spending 3.5 per cent directly on defence and 1.5 per cent on defence-related spending (such as resilience, R&D and support for Ukraine).

Is it getting harder for Serbian president Aleksandar Vučić to maintain his balancing act between Moscow and the West? Why else, after all, would Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) suddenly revive a year-old story about covert arms supplies to Ukraine? Back in June of last year, the Financial Times splashed the story that Serbia had exported around €800 million (£673 million) worth of ammunition to third parties that then ended up being transferred to Ukraine. At the time, Vučić did not try to deny this, but said that it had nothing to do with Serbia. 'We have had many contracts with Americans, Spaniards, Czechs, others,' he said. 'What they do with that in the end is their job.' This is a warning and a gift all in one This is nonsense.

Ceasefire then talks, or talks then ceasefire? This has emerged as one of the pivotal issues in the diplomacy around the war in Ukraine, even if one could question just how genuine both sides are in their respective positions. The proposed talks in Istanbul on Thursday may help clarify matters, but both sides seem more committed to appeasing the White House than talking peace. On Saturday, the usual suspects of Europe – the leaders of the UK, France, Germany and Poland – met in Kyiv and demanded Vladimir Putin call an immediate 30-day ceasefire, on pain of further sanctions. The usual pattern for peace talks is indeed a cessation of hostilities first, talks later, but there was no serious plan for negotiations in that span.

It was almost like old times, but also a sign of the new. Vladimir Putin’s Victory Day parade passed off without a hitch, rumbling and squeaking with armour, untroubled by Ukrainian drones, and watched over by foreign leaders there in a sign of support. Yet the efforts made to ensure the parade ran smoothly, the nature of the guest list, and Putin’s rhetoric all highlighted the new times. The most recent iterations of the parade had been distinctly reduced affairs, a single Second World War vintage T-34 tank substituting for the usual phalanx of tanks, and the guests largely confined to Putin’s clients.

So the on-again-off-again US-Ukrainian resources deal has been signed. It is perhaps appropriate that it was done without fanfare, marked by emailed press release. While its terms are rather better than originally mooted, it still shows not that ‘the Trump administration is committed to a peace process centred on a free, sovereign, and prosperous Ukraine’ as US Treasury secretary Scott Bessent put it, but to neo-colonial exploitation. For all that, Kyiv has some reason to be satisfied by what it considers less of an economic deal and more a necessary piece of performative submission to keep Donald Trump engaged with their cause.

Even by the elevated standards of Kremlin cynicism, Vladimir Putin's invocation of a three-day ceasefire across the span of the Victory Day celebrations commemorating the end of the second world war in Europe takes some beating. Putin is well aware of Kyiv's capacity to embarrass him on this of all days He has announced that ‘all military actions’ in Ukraine would be suspended between midnight on 8 May to midnight on 11 May, to cover the celebrations on 9 May (Russia celebrates a day later than the rest of Europe) which, because of the span of time zones across this huge country, lasts longer than 24 hours.

Friday morning, Lieutenant General Yaroslav Moskalik was heading out from his flat in Balashikha, a commuter town east of Moscow, when a car bomb exploded, killing him. There can be little doubt this is an operation by Ukrainian intelligence, another example of their capacity to launch skilful targeted assassinations in the heart of Russia. But will it actually change anything? That is more doubtful. It is hard not to assume this was another killing by the Ukrainians Moskalik was not a high-profile figure, but as deputy head of the General Staff’s Main Operations Directorate (GOU), he was a capable officer and potentially on a career track for even higher office.

The unfolding tale of incendiary devices planted in DHL packages across Europe not only highlights the dangers of Moscow’s campaign of direct measures against the West. It also suggests that, contrary to more alarmist claims, it is possible for such threats to be deterred and limited. In July of last year, a package bound for Britain ignited in the section of Leipzig airport devoted to DHL cargo freight. Another caught fire later that month in a DHL depot in Birmingham. Two more were found in Poland, one of which set light to a warehouse in Warsaw, while the other was successfully intercepted.

Sergei Naryshkin, director of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), is in many ways an uncomfortable and ephemeral spy chief, but an enthusiastic information warrior. In recent talks with the Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko, he accused Nato of threatening Moscow and Minsk by increasing the size and activity of its forces on the border – or rather, certain nations within the alliance: We feel and see that European countries, especially France, Britain and Germany, are increasing the level of escalation around the Ukrainian conflict, so we need to act pre-emptively. We are ready for this.

Ever since Donald Trump's now-infamous phone conversation with Vladimir Putin last month, Russia has been buzzing with speculation that Western companies which left the country after the 2022 invasion, especially US ones, will be returning. For some, this is a dream, for others a nightmare. Either way, it seems to be an overblown prospect fuelled by a refusal to accept just how toxic the Russian market will be for the foreseeable future. Under the headline 'Now Hello Again? How American Companies Will Return to Russia,' the popular tabloid Moskovsky Komsomolets yesterday confidently asserted that 'American business wants to return to Russia, but now the game will be played by Russian rules'.

Ever since 2013, I’ve been hearing that Vladimir Putin is going to die any day. Is Volodymyr Zelensky now trying to spin the same line? At a press conference this week, the Ukrainian President said of Putin, ‘He will die soon – that’s a fact – and it will all be over', adding ‘I’m younger than Putin, so put your bets on me. My prospects are better.’ Admittedly, in actuarial terms, the 47-year-old Zelensky is likely to outlive the 72-year-old Russian leader. However, while the average life expectancy of someone born in the USSR in 1952, like Putin, is just 57, his grandfather Spirodon lived to the age of 86 and his father Vladimir Spirodonovich to 88.

The delegation Moscow sent to ceasefire talks in Saudi Arabia was clearly well-chosen. Grigory Karasin, for example, the former diplomat (including a spell as ambassador to the United Kingdom, 2000-5) and Sergei Beseda, head of the Federal Security Service’s Fifth Service, especially responsible for penetrating and subverting Ukraine. They certainly seem to be doing a good job of advancing Russia’s interests at the talks. After Vladimir Putin reportedly acceded to a month-long moratorium on strikes against energy infrastructure (which both Moscow and Kyiv are already accusing the other side of breaking), the latest round of talks seem to have led to the acceptance of the other leg of this painfully limited ceasefire, on attacks on civilian shipping in the Black Sea.