Pakistan

So what is Pakistan up to? Cameron has a point: it is playing a dangerous double game which I once outlined in a piece. But in today's Spectator, it is all spelled out by a writer who is - in my view - the best authority on this mess and by some margin. Ahmed Rashid, whose book Descent into Chaos is the definitive work on the Afghan war, explains that Karzai has effectively switched sides - he's given up on Nato (as, it seems, has Cameron) and now wants Pakistan to preside over talks with the Taliban: " A few months ago Hamid Karzai would have been thrilled to have confirmation that American officers are speaking openly about how divisions of Pakistani intelligence are helping the Taleban.

The implosion of General McChrsytal’s career has refocused attention on Afghanistan. Reading Peggy Noonan’s column on the subject I was struck by this paragraph reflecting on Jonathan Alter’s reporting of Obama’s decision making process when he ordered the surge: More crucially, the president asked policy makers, in Mr. Alter's words, "If the Taliban took Kabul and controlled Afghanistan, could it link up with Pakistan's Taliban and threaten command and control of Pakistan's nuclear weapons?" The answer: Quite possibly yes. Mr. Alter: "Early on, the President eliminated withdrawal (from Afghanistan) as an option, in part because of a new classified study on what would happen to Pakistan's nuclear arsenal if the Islamabad government fell to the Taliban.

The proverbial shoe is dropping. Following General Stanley McChrystal’s forced retirement, a consensus is forming that President Obama's Afghan strategy is not working. The Economist says: ‘Since November, when Mr Obama promised 30,000 more of his country’s soldiers to the campaign, little has gone right. General McChrystal’s plan was for a “surge” that would seize the initiative from the Taliban and create the scope for Afghanistan’s government, backed by its army and police, to take charge. In practice that has not happened.’ In the Financial Times, Ahmed Rashid makes a similar point, arguing that the military strategy in Afghanistan is "failing".

Richard Holbrooke, the U.S. diplomat in charge of Afghanistan and Pakistan affairs said Washington has now publicly made clear the US government is serious about negotiating with the Taliban. Speaking at a conference in Madrid, the US envoy said: ‘Let me be clear on one thing, everybody understands that this war will not end in a clear-cut military victory. It's not going to end on the deck of a battleship like World War Two, or Dayton, Ohio, like the Bosnian war It's going to have some different ending from that, some form of political settlements are necessary ... you can't have a settlement with al Qaeda, you can't talk to them, you can't negotiate with them, it's out of the question. But it is possible to talk to Taliban leaders.

In opposition, the Conservatives pursued an AfPak policy that can best be described as loyal criticism - while they supported the mission they criticised the means and methods employed to achieve it. It was an effective line of attack. But now that they have the internal documents and can call for further intelligence assessments, they should instead undertake a zero-based review of the current strategy focusing on: 1) the viability of the current US approach; 2) the likely timing and manner of a US shift; and 3) the best role for the UK in the next six months, in the next 2 years and in the next five years. In this discussion nothing – absolutely nothing – must be off the table.

"Going Dutch" will take on a whole new meaning now that the collapse of the Dutch government looks set to result in the country's departure from Afghanistan. Withdrawal had been on the cards for at least a year - especially as the coalition Labour party had campaigned to return Dutch troops at the last election. But now the process has gone into overdrive.   Militarily, the competent Dutch forces will be sorely missed. They have done a really quite impressive job in Uruzgan province. But the Dutch pullback will be an even bigger problem politically. NATO likes to refer to the dictum it formulated during the Balkan operations - "in together, out together".

On Wednesday, Baroness Kinnock told the Lords that a number of Foreign Office departments had been hit been hit by an estimated £110 million budget shortfall, and that an anti-drug program in Kabul has been cut.  Coming after British dismay at President Karzai's desire to put Afghanistan's former (and widely-discredited) Interior Minister, Zarar Ahmad Moqbel, in charge of the country's anti-drug effort, the cuts are bound to cause concern. Afghanistan is the world's leading supplier of opiates, trafficked as opium, morphine and heroin. Over 90 percent of the heroin on the UK's streets originates from Afghanistan. Though cuts to counterterrorism programs are probably ill-advised, there is less reason to worry about the impact on any anti-drug efforts.