Weaponising trade; interfering in the domestic affairs of open societies; using technological dependencies to undermine national security; threatening to invade and occupy weaker democratic neighbours. How do we respond to such behaviour? We sanction Russia and aid Ukraine. We at least talk about what it means with China. But we cling to the hope that, come 2029, we can forget that any of the above could describe the actions of the United States. This is delusional.
We must push back while we still can
Currently, the United States is waging a trade war with Canada: a country with which we share a close alliance, a cultural heritage and a sovereign, but the UK has said nothing. Standing with Canada against American intimidation is morally correct and in Britain’s own long-term interests.
It is now par for the course in Washington’s engagements with its allies to threaten annexation, economic coercion, withdrawal of military support and leveraging technological dependency. The ‘special relationship’ has not made the UK immune. The threat of 100 per cent tariffs and cancellation of the bilateral trade agreement if we do not abolish the Digital Service Tax is only the latest in a string of American interventions on British issues ranging from trade to free speech.
By supporting Canada, rhetorically and materially (should it come to it), we can demonstrate that America’s power over its allies is not so great that it can treat them as vassals to be plundered. Washington’s increasing belligerence towards its allies should scare us. The longer we wait to push back, the harder it will be to do so.
We are in the early days of a long-term strategic shift as Britain faces challenges unprecedented in our modern history. Avoiding Trump’s anger might make things easier for the current government, but failing to assert our interests now is a recipe for disaster in the long run. For the first time in more than two centuries, we find ourselves in a world of great power competition in which we are not a great power ourselves – and in which our national interests increasingly diverge from those of the US who, together with China, exists on the other side of a widening technological gulf which we cannot hope to close.
This will not change, regardless of who enters the White House in 2029. A superpower which is no longer a hegemon stops having an interest in propping up a global alliance network, let alone a rules-based order. If America wishes to compete with China, that will require most of its strategic attention and resources. If it does not, China’s power and influence across the globe will grow – and the logical choice for the United States will be to withdraw and enjoy the wealth and security afforded it by its geography. In either scenario, Washington’s interests will diverge significantly from those of its current allies, whose dependence will make them ripe for exploitation.
Together, with other US allies, Britain has a window of opportunity to assert our interests before enough precedent for capitulation has been set and before the technological gulf with the US widens to a point at which we are forced to accept perpetual vassalage.
Fortunately, various factors work in our favour. US allies may be highly exposed, but interdependence can be leveraged by both sides, as Canada is demonstrating. All US allies have a shared interest in preventing the slide into coercion and dependence; the coordination problems that exist in dealing with the threat posed by China, for instance, do not exist in the same way.
Trump has shown repeatedly that he will back down when he meets serious resistance. He is also given to creating far more foreign policy challenges than the US can hope to deal with simultaneously. The war with Iran, in particular, has pushed Washington into a moment of strategic weakness. We need to exploit it.
Avoiding Trump’s anger might make things easier for the current government, but failing to assert our interests now is a recipe for disaster in the long run
If we cannot do this now, we will have no hope of doing so in the more disorderly world to come. If we do not stand up for allies, we risk them turning a blind eye when we next fall into Washington’s crosshairs. If we do not start thinking in terms of interests, leverage and statecraft, we will not develop the strategies for retaliation and managed escalation we may well need in future. A US that antagonises allies must face costs, even if that ultimately extends beyond diplomatic penalties and reciprocal tariffs to withdrawal of basing rights or expulsion from Nato.
These are not things that Britain’s leaders, nor those of other allies, wish to contemplate. But Canada understands what is at stake and where things could go. Britain has got used to the US as a generally benign hegemon. But sentimentality for the ‘special relationship’ should be tempered by the pre-hegemonic history of the US. This was a nation committed to aggressive expansionism across North America, and one that went to war with European powers with which its interests conflicted. It was a nation which, in becoming a superpower, systematically dismantled the economic order that had allowed its wartime allies to flourish. In such actions it was often on the ‘right side of history’, but it was also a major power acting in its own interests, against those with whom those interests conflicted. We have no reason to expect a post-hegemonic US to behave differently.
We are still at the beginning of this long-term shift, but we must recognise where it could go. We must already worry about a belligerent Russia and increasingly powerful China. But a hostile United States poses a far greater risk to our interests and, ultimately, our sovereignty. Instead of a post-Trump return to normal in 2029, we should be thinking about how we would cope with a subsequent US government with greater coercive capacity, an actual strategy for employing it, and national interests that increasingly oppose our own. We must push back while we still can.
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