Roderick Crawford

Rishi Sunak’s government has succeeded in renegotiating the Protocol, despite EU insistence that this could not and would not be done. That there is a Windsor Framework is proof of that. A new geopolitical reality in Europe required Western unity, it is true, but there was more than that.   The UK found a way to persuade the EU of the moral, political and legal case for a renegotiation — overturning the significant moral, political and legal impediments that held the EU back from any ‘renegotiation’.  This was due to an intellectual transformation of the understanding of the relationship of the Good Friday Agreement and the Protocol — one promoted by the UK rather than Ireland.

At the heart of the crisis over the Protocol is its failure to deliver on its own stated aims. To understand this crisis, it is necessary to know some key aspects of the Protocol’s genesis and history. Exactly a month after Theresa May triggered Article 50, the European Commission was instructed by the member states (the European Council of 27) with ensuring the UK’s orderly withdrawal from the EU, including finding arrangements for the island of Ireland. That meant securing the Good Friday Agreement and avoiding a hard border.

The jibes thrown at Boris Johnson over his unhappiness with the Northern Ireland protocol — based on the obvious observation that he was the one who signed it — have been based on the assumption that he is either a liar or a fool. A liar because he knew full well what he was signing up to, or a fool for not knowing what he was agreeing to. Does anyone think that officials told him that the protocol would prevent Northern Ireland having access to some cancer drugs? Or guide dogs being unable to move between GB and NI? Keir Starmer has repeated the jibe about Johnson. A further version is that Johnson did not care if Northern Ireland paid the price so long as the UK left the EU.