Europe

Others have already been there, but it's still worth noting Douglas Alexander's article for the lastest issue of the New Statesman. Much of it, it's true, is a predictable attack on David Cameron's recent activity in Brussels. But slightly more surprising is the fact that, rather than criticising the coalition in toto, Alexander saves his ire for the Tories and reaches out to the Lib Dems. Here's the relevant passage: ‘The roots of what happened on the night of Thursday 8 December lie deep in Cameron's failure to modernise the Tory party. Just because he puts party interest before the national interest, there is no reason others should do the same.

As the effects of last week's European Council become clear, debate about the rights and wrongs of David Cameron's diplomacy hinge on one question: were his demands ‘reasonable and modestly expressed’, as a source in No 10 put it to me? Everyone knows that there were chronic failures in the run-up to the meeting itself. I laid a few of them out in an earlier post, but, basically, they amount to a failure of prioritisation: the UK eroded the goodwill it needed by fighting tooth-and-nail on every issue beforehand, thereby blocking things that other EU states care about but which are not important, except symbolically, to the British. International — and especially European — cooperation is about give-and-take. It cannot just be take.

Reading through the paper's this morning, it's even clearer that we didn't learn much from that marathon Europe debate yesterday. But here are my thoughts, anyway, on where it leaves us: 1) Ed Miliband lacked credibility from the outset. As Malcolm Rifkind put it, he’s had three days to work out whether he’d have signed that Treaty or not — and he still can’t make his mind up. God knows Cameron is vulnerable on this, but he won’t be hurt being attacked for indecision by a man who still cant make any decisions. 2) Clegg’s misjudgment, cont? First, Clegg backed Cameron after the veto. Now, he says he disagrees with Cameron.

David Cameron’s decision, in the wee hours of Friday morning, to make clear that he would veto the proposed treaty change will have many far-reaching effects. One is that other European leaders know that Cameron is prepared to follow through on a threat to veto. As Charles Moore says in The Telegraph today, the dynamic that has existed throughout this country’s participation in the European project — that “Britain huffs and puffs, but always agrees in the end” — has now changed. This morning, those close to the Tory leadership were pointing out that a Cameron threat to, for example, veto the budget next year will be taken far more seriously than it would have been previously.

The word ‘isolation’ is used a lot in today's newspapers, as if Cameron walking away from the ongoing EU implosion were a self-evident disaster. Pick up the Guardian and you see Britain cast as a leper, a status conferred on her thanks to a tragic miscalculation by a Prime Minister whose sole aim was to assuage his swivel-eyed Tory MPs and get back on Bill Cash's Christmas card list. Orwell would have great fun with the language that accompanies the Euro project: trying to suck up to its tiny elite is seen as a country being outward looking. A PM more focused on the people who sent him to office is seen as a parochialist. Spend too much time in SW1 and you may come to believe this yourself.

What now? That’s the question. This morning it looks not like 17 versus 10, but like 1 versus 26, which is a cold and lonely place for Britain to be. But it is also the right place to be. David Cameron asked for a little and got less. He had to act as he did and will reap the benefit electorally and among his MPs. Labour’s position is not just politically weak, but also unrealistic: it has been clear for weeks it was not possible to run a ‘periphery strategy’ as the 10 states outside the Euro have different incentives to Britain and different long-term aims. And the idea that the last Labour government had better links to the continent is laughable.