There was always a risk that the external reviewers who led last year’s Strategic Defence Review would turn on the government. George Robertson’s intervention last week – saying that the government was not doing enough to improve Britain’s defence, saying a ‘corrosive complacency’ had set in – was born of deep frustration about the large gap between Labour’s lofty rhetoric on defence, and reality.
Robertson’s threat analysis was overly pessimistic. Russia is not about to launch a military offensive on a Nato member. Britain does not face Russia alone. He was right, however, to criticise ‘lethargic thinking’, and the lack of urgency to rebuild our brittle armed forces.
Although Robertson focused his ire on the ‘non-military experts in the Treasury’, in truth the latest imbroglio is a result of the failure of the First Lord of the Treasury – the Prime Minister – to lead, to adapt to changed strategic circumstances, to honour promises made to our allies, and to be open with the public. We should not expect a change in course while he remains in office.
The Labour manifesto signalled continuity from the previous government’s approach. The party promised to sustain the trilateral Aukus security partnership with Australia and the United States, support Ukraine, while stating an ‘unshakeable commitment to Nato and our nuclear deterrent’. It also promised to rebuild the armed forces.
But defence was not one of Starmer’s key ‘missions’ for government. The manifesto only committed to a SDR within a year and to ‘set out the path’ to spending 2.5 per cent of GDP on defence at some point in the future. Loyal former treasury minister John Healey was appointed defence secretary to toe the Treasury line and steady the department.
The PM’s ‘steady as she goes’ approach has proven to be seriously out of sync with changes in the strategic environment, in particular Trump’s demand on taking office that Europe take responsibility for its own conventional defence. Even after the new US defence secretary personally told Nato defence ministers to do more, Starmer’s team were still trotting out the tired mantra about ‘setting out the path’ to increased spending when ‘economic circumstances allow’.
Ahead of a meeting in the White House in February last year, in a panicked move, Starmer belatedly set a revised target of 2.6 per cent of GDP by 2027, and agreed to an ‘ambition’ of 3 per cent by the end of the next parliament. At the Nato summit last June, he then had to agree to a common target of 3.5 per cent by 2035.
Although Labour now like to spin Starmer’s volte face as a sign of leadership, he would not have shifted position without US pressure. Anyway, the Chancellor has refused to even set out how Britain will reach these higher targets, and an increase to 2.6 per cent two years early is inadequate when judged against the growing risk of the US distancing itself further from Europe, a risk that has only increased after Starmer’s initial indecisiveness over the Iran war.
The SDR, finally published in June 2025, was a well-meaning curate’s egg. Presented by Starmer as radical in an attempt to burnish his defence credentials, it broadly re-affirmed almost all of the existing defence programme while charting a fresh course if/when additional money begins to flow in the 2030s. Insiders tell me that many of the most eye-catching details (12 new attack submarines, 7,000 long-range missiles, and purchase of nuclear capable US fighters etc) were added over the heads of the reviewers to beef up the deterrent effect of the end product.
But the SDR did not match strategic ends to ways and means. It did not consider whether the UK should focus militarily or stop doing some things to free up money for investment elsewhere. It did not prioritise its 62 recommendations, suggest a layout of the size and shape of the future armed forces (as past similar reviews have done), nor contain a coherent and funded ten-year programme to deliver it. This was left to the Defence Investment Plan.
Separation of aspiration and implementation has led inevitably to Whitehall spats and tactical budgetary sausage-making at the expense of strategic thinking. This leaves the military at risk – again – of short-termist decisions and cherry-picking of SDR recommendations. The DIP is months late. No wonder Robertson is furious, even if he himself is partly to blame for the incoherence at the heart of his report.
There is no sign that Starmer will change course
The result is uncertainty, for those serving in the armed forces, for British industry, and for our allies. Spending 2.6 per cent of GDP on defence will just about keep the current programme afloat. With the existing equipment programme overheated by around £28 billion until 2030, the Chancellor only willing to give £10 billion over the same period, and the government unwilling to reduce ambition, we should expect more defence cuts, making the armed forces still smaller and less capable. Vital MoD reforms to get more out of the defence budget will not plug this gap. The UK also will continue to slide down the Nato league table. The lack of a clear path to 3.5 per cent will further damage our reputation with its allies, in particular the United States. Russia also sees through the hollow tough talk.
There is no sign that Starmer will change course or shift the balance between his domestic priorities and investment in defence. Robertson criticised the absence of a promised national conversation on defence; although defence has increased as a public concern since the start of the year, people are torn on whether defence spending should be increased at the expense of other public services. Labour judge that defence is not going to win them re-election. At a recent conference in London, Healey blandly repeated government talking points, laughably claimed Britain was ‘ready for war’, and gave no hint of fresh thinking or new money.
Starmer has come to disingenuously specialise in talking big on defence while doing little about it. He once hubristically used the phrase ‘reverse Midas touch’ to describe Rishi Sunak’s travails. Two years into his own premiership, as he staggers aimlessly from crisis to crisis, defence is another policy area to suffer from Starmer’s innate ability to turn anything he touches to dirt.
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